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Trust, power or money: What governs business relationships? 
 
 
Abstract 
This article suggests conceptualising trust as a generalised symbolic medium of 
communication. It is argued that in business relationships trust appears intertwined with other 
media, such as power or money. Furthermore, it is shown that typical combinations of trust, 
power and money are dominant in different business systems (liberal vs. coordinated market 
economies). The overarching aim of this article is to demonstrate that trust is a fundamental 
concept of social theory and that the theory of generalised symbolic media of communication 
provides a useful conceptual perspective to integrate trust into social theory.   
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Introduction 
 
Practitioners and scholars alike have recently placed enormous emphasis on business 
organisations' capacity to build and maintain trust in their relationships with suppliers, 
customers and other stakeholders. Clearly, this is not by accident. Inter-organisational 
relationships which build on trust tend to incur lower transaction costs as the trusting party 
has less of a need to monitor the trustee (Zaheer et al., 1998). They are typically characterised 
by increased flexibility and readiness to adapt to each other's interests and needs (Sako, 1998; 
Luo, 2002), and by greater openness between business partners (Dyer and Chu, 2003; Sydow, 
2006). The latter can facilitate innovation which might otherwise not be possible 
(Nooteboom, 2006). Especially where two organisations have complementary knowledge or 
other resources, these brought together can spark off the development of new products, 
services and production processes. 
  With all this in mind it seems somewhat surprising that there are also many voices 
which are sceptical about the notion that trust can really play a decisive role in contemporary 
business relations. When (over-)enthusiastic trust researchers are heralding a new age of 
cooperation and trust (e.g. Heckscher and Adler, 2006), they point to examples of fierce price 
wars in the consumer electronics industry (Financial Times, 2013) or large food retailers 
simply using their market power to relentlessly squeeze their suppliers (The Guardian, 2011). 
According to their observations trust has no place in times of hyper-competition and cut-
throat profit maximisation. 
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 On closer inspection these two perspectives are less contradictory than it seems. In inter-
organisational relationships, trust, power and money constitute coordination mechanisms 
which are by no means mutually exclusive (also see Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa [2005] on 
trust and control). For many firms trust-based relationships with closely cooperating allies are 
a central precondition for being able to aggressively compete with other business 
organisations and to play their power games effectively. But also within one and the same 
relationship trust is typically only one element besides other governance mechanisms. A firm 
may have some basic trust in a business partner but also consider other means to safeguard 
against unexpected events that might threaten a vitally important relationship. Vice versa, a 
firm may secure the fulfilment of basic commitments by a business partner by way of their 
power but rely on trust where their ability to control their partner's behaviour reaches its 
limits. In the following, we will undertake to conceptually unravel the interrelations between 
all three coordination principles which are relevant in regard to governing business 
relationships: trust, power and money.  
 In so doing, our main interest lies with trust, whose role in business relationships is, 
compared to power and money, not equally well understood. One of the reasons for this is 
that, unlike money and power, trust has been neglected for the most part of the history of 
social thought (with few exceptions; e.g. Simmel, 1950). It is only in the last two decades or 
so, as organisational networks have received increasing attention in organisational practice 
and research (Zaheer et.al, 2000), that its fundamental importance has been appreciated more 
fully. In business studies, sociology and the social sciences as a whole, trust has arrived late, 
yet very forcefully (also see Sztompka, 1996).  
 While there may indeed be many reasons for the currently widely shared interest in trust  
(Grey and Garsten, 2001), these undoubtedly include the most recent massive decline of trust 
in some areas of business and society, such as the banking sector (e.g., Gillespie et al., 2012), 
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which has (painfully) confirmed the relevance of trust in today's socio-economic 
relationships. Where the organisation of economic exchanges is analysed in our highly 
developed business world, trust no longer appears as a marginal concept but as a social 
category which is just as fundamental and important as power and money. 
 In order to systematically analyse the interconnections between trust, power and money 
in inter-organisational relationships, the remainder of this paper will first approach these 
mechanisms from a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) inspired angle and view them as 
fundamental governance principles, typically associated with specific organisational forms 
(section 2). We will then draw on the theory of 'generalised symbolic media of 
communication' and discuss the question of whether trust can be understood as such a 
medium of communication and thus be conceptually framed as a mechanism on a par with 
power and money (section 3). Subsequently, we will examine which combinations of trust, 
power and money appear viable, expedient and empirically realistic, and how these 
combinations are facilitated in business relationships (section 4). Following from these 
insights, we will investigate whether, and if so, how typical combinations of media are 
associated with specific types of business systems (section 5). The final section (6) will 
conclude with a short summary of our argument.    
 
Trust, power and money as governance principles 
 
TCE offers some valuable insights into the function of trust in business relationships. Despite 
the fact that Williamson (1985; 1993) himself insisted that trust cannot play a significant role 
in business relationships and its analysis should be restricted to other social exchanges, there 
are numerous TCE inspired scholars who believe that there is clearly a place for trust within 
the TCE framework and effectively conceive of trust, power and money as three coordination 
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mechanisms related to different organisational governance regimes. From a TCE point of 
view, Bradach and Eccles (1989) argue that inter-organisational relationships based on 
'hierarchy' resemble intra-organisational relations, with one party depending on the other and 
drawing on power as the key governance principle. 'Market'-based relationships are inter-
organisational relationships where money, more than anything else, coordinates the relevant 
actors' expectations and interactions. And, finally, 'hybrid' forms of cooperation – i.e., 
network-based relationships – build on trust as the principal coordination mechanism 
between business partners (also see Powell, 1990; 1996). 
 In similar vein, Adler (2001) suggests that there are 3 'ideal-typical' governance 
mechanisms which are relevant in different forms of intra-/inter-organisational relationships: 
the market principle which operates on the basis of prices; the principle of hierarchy where 
authority connects expectations and interactions; and 'community', which requires trust as a 
central mechanism to control communication between the relevant actors.     
 Bradach and Eccles (1989) as well as Adler (2001) seem to build on the same notion: 
Trust, power and money can be viewed as coordination mechanisms which channel the 
expectations of individual and/or collective economic actors and direct social conduct into 
certain modes of exchange. They trigger specific patterns of interaction and gear expectations 
in such a way that actors will find it relatively easy to swiftly connect to each other in their 
relationships. If it is, for example, money that 'talks' in a market-based relationship then 
actors will know that they need to follow the behavioural patterns designed for buyers or 
sellers and express their interests in terms of prices. If power or 'hierarchy' is the dominant 
mode of interaction the relevant actors will draw on behavioural repertoires internalised in 
previous situations where they either have followed the demands of a powerful actor or 
mobilised their own power resources in order to ensure coordinated interaction with their 
subordinates. In the case of trust, actors take the roles of trustors or trustees, and the trustor 
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will behave as if more information was available than there actually is, and their positive 
expectations of the trustee's future behaviour was a certainty. Trustors thus accept the risk 
that their expectations may be disappointed in exchange for the chance to reap the benefits of 
a trust-based relationship which, for example, can save costs that would occur with extensive 
control and monitoring efforts or enable mutually beneficial cooperative relationships leading 
to innovation and shared economic success. 
 On the basis of these considerations one can safely conclude that trust has a fundamental 
function in business relationships and that it is not just a nice accessory to complement a 
harmonious corporate culture or participatory management style. Consistent with some 
strands of sociological research, we propose trust to be one of the most important and deep-
seated mechanisms that can secure successful interaction in business relationships. Its wide-
spread utilisation could – in Kantian terms – even be seen as a 'condition of the possibility' of 
the existence of differentiated socio-economic systems (Luhmann, 1979; Giddens, 1990).     
 Putting the significance of trust on a par with power and money seems an important step 
in understanding the role of trust in today's business world. However, the TCE inspired 
conceptualisation of trust also has some severe limitations. Possibly the most restrictive 
among these is its tendency to view the three coordination mechanisms as relatively separate 
from one another. Despite the fact that Bradach and Eccles (1989) as well as Adler (2001) 
allow combinations of these mechanisms, they are rather silent on how to systematically 
account for mixtures of trust, power and money and to elicit, for instance, the effects of trust 
alongside those of power in hierarchies or money in markets.  
 Moving away from the institutional economics oriented view and looking more at 
sociological approaches to conceptualising trust, some groundwork has been done in this 
strand of literature with regard to the question of whether and how trust and power could be 
combined within one and the same business relationship (Bachmann, 2001). In these studies, 
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however, money is largely ignored. Sociological trust research has, thus, so far equally failed 
to take on the the task to carefully reconstruct the manifold possibilities of the complex 
interplay between different forms of trust, power and money. In the following, we will 
explore in how far the theory of generalised symbolic media (as a specifically sociological 
theory) may be able to offer a deeper and more systematic understanding of how money, 
power and trust can jointly do their jobs within a single business relationship. 
 
Trust, power and money as generalised symbolic media 
 
Parsons' and Luhmann's media-theoretical approaches 
From our point of view, sociological media theory, as developed by Parsons and Luhmann, 
offers a fruitful perspective for analysing the intricate interplay of trust, power and money, 
the latter two mechanisms being already well-established in this conceptual approach. In 
Parsons' (1977) theory, money takes on a central position, as the 'paradigmatic medium' upon 
which the analysis of other media is largely modelled. In Parsons' view, money as a medium 
ensures swift exchanges and the re-allocation of legitimised claims of ownership rights which 
constitutes the 'economic system', whereas power is identified as the 'currency' which is 
characteristic of the 'political system', and 'influence' the medium which constitutes what he 
calls 'societal community' (Parsons and Smelser1956). 
 With regard to what are perceived as main social coordination principles, this conceptual 
perspective resembles the TCE approach and Adler's view quite closely, particularly if we 
relate 'influence' in a 'societal community' context to trust. Clearly, as a social theorist 
Parsons does not focus on business relationships only and sees power and trust has having 
their genuine places in other realms of society. But if we adopt a more integrative view and 
understand business organisations' exchanges as deeply embedded  in society as a whole 
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(Granovetter, 1985) we might well assume that the political system as well as 'societal 
community' reach into the economic system in a constitutive manner, while money may 
nonetheless stand out as the primary medium in this sphere of society.  
 These considerations open up a promising approach to the question of how exactly trust, 
power and money might be combined in business relationships. In order to address it we 
suggest investigating whether power and trust – the latter, of course, remaining the focus of 
our interest – may be conceptualised as second-order media of communication which could 
in business relationships draw upon money as the overriding principle.  
 With regard to a multi-media perspective, however, Parsons' version of media theory 
may not necessarily represent the ideal theoretical basis for our endeavour. Similar to TCE 
inspired views, his approach seems somewhat rigid with regard to the allocation of media to 
different spheres of society. Luhmann (1976; 1995) has further developed Parsons' theory of 
generalised symbolic interaction and appears more informative with regard to our interest in 
the combinability of media. He suggests four basic generalised symbolic media of 
communication in society – money, power, truth/normative judgement and love – and allows 
for quite a few more media which he calls 'codes' if they are structured in a binary manner. 
For example, art, religion or the medical discourse can build on such codes and constitute 
more specific domains in differentiated societies which interfere with the four more general 
media in complex combinations. Compared to Parsons' approach, this conceptual perspective 
seems to provide considerable more room for our endeavour to reconceptualise trust from a 
media theoretical perspective. Furthermore, Luhmann himself (1979) has presented a 
thorough investigation of the concept of trust which, at least implicitly, suggests that trust 
may indeed be seen as a medium, very similar to power and money. He stops short of stating 
this explicitly. Thus, it will be helpful to examine some of the basic premises underlying 
Luhmann's systems theoretical approach. 
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What are generalised symbolic media of communication?  
Different from Parsons' view, Luhmann's understanding of generalised symbolic media 
clearly owes to analogies to language (a re-orientation in late 20th century social theory which 
he shares with Habermas [1984/1987] and others). For Luhmann, the function of generalised 
symbolic media of communication begins where the effectiveness of ordinary language ends. 
As modern societies become ever more differentiated and social functions are more and more 
specialised, all three elements of communication – i.e., that a message is created, transmitted, 
and especially that it is understood – become increasingly improbable. Under these 
conditions, ordinary language is too varied and indeterminate to create sufficient social order 
on its own. Indeed, it is fit to exacerbate the problem of complexity, as it generates more 
rather than less communicative options, making it more difficult to link social actions 
('speech acts' for that matter) into one another, and this is exactly where generalised symbolic 
media of communication and their function within complex structures of interaction appear to 
have their place and purpose.  
 In principle, every social action is liable to draw boundaries, introduce arbitrary 
distinctions, and thus create an excess of possibilities. From these possibilities, selections 
need to be made and stabilised (Krieger, 1996). This is what – in Luhmann's view – makes 
generalised symbolic media of communication indispensable in differentiated modern 
societies (Morgner, 2014). They allow for the transfer of selectivity of meaning between 
actors, and hence effective communication, by providing specialised signal systems which 
are able to convey specific information simpler and faster than ordinary language could. They 
reduce, for example, the number of accepted meanings to those which can be expressed in 
terms of prices and thus have a huge advantage with regard to the speed and accuracy of the 
transmission of meaning. As Murphy points out, here 'order  results from a confluence of 
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persons' cognitive categories' (1987: 208; also see Morgner, 2014).  Thus, it simplifies 
communication considerably if in a specific context all speech acts can be interpreted in 
terms of truth/normative judgement, love, power (claims of superiority and their acceptance), 
money (prices – demanded and paid) or – as we would argue – trust (pre-commitments and 
fulfilment of expectations). With regard to trust, let us now look at some of its specific 
characteristics which may indeed suggest that trust can be seen as a generalised symbolic 
medium of communication, but also consider some objections one might have against such a 
perspective before we come to a conclusion on this question.  
 
Trust as a generalised symbolic medium: Connections 
Firstly, Luhmann (1979) leaves no doubt that the key function of trust is the reduction of 
social complexity – an insight which is confirmed throughout current trust research. This is a 
central argument supporting the view that trust can be seen as a generalised symbolic medium 
of communication. Like other media it does so by reducing the number of possible 
interpretations and expectations specifically in regard to the motivations and future intentions 
underlying the actions of a relevant other (Arnoldi, 2010). Where, e.g., the use of money 
reduces complexity in that it channels the semantics of social actors' communication along 
the lines of offering and accepting prices (Parsons, 1967), trust suspends overwhelming 
complexity as it upholds some specific expectations regarding another actor's future 
behaviour and ignores all other possibilities. 
 Secondly, trust demonstrates its usefulness – and this is closely related to our first point – 
 in situations of double contingency, where social coordination becomes problematic as the 
future actions of both self and other are a limine unpredictable (Luhmann, 1995; Luhmann, 
1976). In such circumstances, actions which follow meaningfully from those of others are 
unlikely unless behavioural complexity can be reduced effectively. Particularly since 
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Luhmann's autopoietic shift in his theory, media work primarily as success media. 
Communicative success builds on social actors' capacity to select realistic interpretations and 
expectations which can be taken as the basis for subsequent communication. Like other 
media, trust provides a way of making such meaningful connections more likely. Where other 
media such as power strive to actively reduce the range of actions available to the subordinate 
party, trust facilitates the coordination of communication by selecting positive expectations 
about alter ego's future behaviour as the basis for ego's actions (Bachmann, 2001). Thus, we 
can conclude that, trust clearly exhibits traits which suggest that it qualifies as a generalised 
symbolic medium of communication. However, there are also grounds to challenge this view. 
At least two questions need to be considered as potential counter-indications.  
 
Trust as a generalised symbolic medium: Potential disconnections 
First, one may argue that the concept of generalised symbolic media of communication 
implies greater transmittability of information than might be assumed for a phenomenon 
which can be as personal and idiosyncratic as trust? This, however, depends strongly on our 
perspective on trust. Psychological research has often regarded trust as a micro-level 
phenomenon, sometimes simply as the result of individual predispositions (Rotter, 1967). In 
similar vein, Rousseau et al. (1998) define trust as a phenomenon which rests deeply in 
individual behaviour. If we assume that trust is tied entirely to individual personalities, a 
transmission of acts of communication would indeed be difficult to conceive on the basis of 
trust.  
 However, trust has also been investigated as an inter-subjective phenomenon (Kroeger, 
2013). In this social constructionist understanding (Berger and Luckmann, 1967), specific 
ways of signalling, building, and using trust are externalised and objectified. As a result, trust 
can be transmitted between (groups of) actors and across organisational boundaries. But even 
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if we do not want to subscribe to this perspective on trust, which directly addresses its meso-
level transmittablility, there is still a wealth of recent research illuminating the impersonal 
aspects of trust and its creation – typically on the basis of its institutional embeddedness 
(Zucker, 1986; Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011). Institutional conditions and antecedents which 
facilitate and encourage the generation of trust (Lane and Bachmann, 1996; 1997) also 
provide ways of transmitting trust between actors. This is consistent with the concept of 
generalised symbolic media, which places emphasis on the chance that actors will select 
communicational possibilities which meaningfully connect to other actors' previous acts of 
communication. In this understanding, trust is certainly not so individual or personal in nature 
that its meaning cannot be transmitted between actors participating in the same social system, 
be it a small group or indeed a large socio-economic system. 
 The second issue one might regard as problematic refers to the fact that trust is not 
connected to any specific societal subsystem. Where money is the symbolically generalised 
medium of communication in the economic and power in the political sphere, science and 
jurisdiction operate through the media of truth and normative judgment, and love has its place 
in intimate private relationships, trust seems to have a much broader societal application 
(Luhmann, 1979). 
 However, the fact that trust is so broadly usable and pervasive, and is not assigned to a 
specific subsystem, seems not to distance it in categorical terms from the concept of 
generalised symbolic media of communication. As noted upon above, Luhmann 
acknowledges explicitly that not all subsystems have specific media – see for instance 
education or medicine (Luhmann, 1990; Luhmann and Schorr, 2000) – and that vice versa, 
not all media are assigned to formalised societal subsystems. Media do not regulate 
institutionalised subsystems as such, but systems of interaction between individuals which are 
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embedded in the prevalent institutional arrangements that are regulated by media or more 
specialised binary codes (Morgner, 2014).  
 
Trust as a generalised symbolic medium of communication: Conclusion 
 Overall, we can conclude from these considerations that differences between trust and 
the most 'typical' (and most frequently discussed) generalised symbolic media of 
communication do not mean that trust is to be discarded as a generalised symbolic medium. 
Especially, it seems that Luhmann's media concept is much wider and more flexible than 
Parsons' theoretical approach (Parsons, 1977), and allows for a range of qualitatively 
different media (Dinkel, 2001). Luhmann's conceptualisation thus opens up the concept of 
symbolically generalised media of communication to historical and empirical definitions 
(Chernilo, 2002), resulting in a long and essentially open list of possible media (see for 
instance the list provided in Krause, 2005). Consequently, although trust exhibits some 
differences from other media – possibly most significantly, it is not bound to a specific 
subsystem but 'societally free-floating' – we would suggest that trust can indeed be seen as a 
symbolically generalised medium of communication and thus be analysed in the terms of 
Luhmann's systems theoretical framework. 
 
Trust: A combinable generalised symbolic medium of communication? 
The above insights into the flexibility of Luhmann's theoretical conception seems to fit with 
the notion of the combinability of media occurring at different levels and prompt us to 
consider trust as a medium which can govern a relationship in connection with other media 
such as power or money. In the business world, for example, money may be seen as the 
overriding medium, supplemented by trust in such a way that the effectiveness of money as a 
generalised symbolic medium of communication can profit from the existence of trust 
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between a buyer and a seller (Marx, 1962; Parsons, 1967).  Thus, we might see money as 
having a primary function in a specific subsystem of society while trust and/or power may 
play a secondary role to underpin the functionability of the overriding principle. From our 
point of view, trust and other media which form the focus of interaction are typically 
interconnected. Trust can 'piggyback' on the primary media which regulate the more specific 
aspects of an interaction system. Combined multiple media can create a relations of mutual 
support so that they enhance (or obstruct) each other's capacity.  
 
Typical combinations of trust, power and money in business relationships 
 
In the following, we will use the above insights to analyse the intricate relationships of trust 
and power as well as trust and money before we move on to test the combinabilty in the 
context of two specific business systems. In our view, all of these three media are – to 
varying degrees – relevant in any business relationship.  
 
Trust and power 
At first glance, it may seem that trust and power are inimical to one another. Either, one 
might argue, a business relationship is based on power or on trust. Our intuitive 
understanding of trust largely supports this view. How could power play a role within a 
firmly trust-based relationship? And why opt for trust if you have the power to arrange things 
the way you want without the risk of getting betrayed by a trustee? In reality, however, there 
many business contexts where trust and power push in different directions, but also many 
situations where trust and power can be combined without much tension occurring between 
these two generalised symbolic media of communication. 
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 Consider, for example, a sales manager who has known another firm's purchasing 
manager face-to-face for a long time and believes that he or she can trust the business partner 
that when some flexibility is needed in regard delivery times, for instance in the case of 
unforeseen events, it would be likely that the sales manager is irritated if the purchasing 
manager showed no understanding and instead insisted solely on the terms of the contract and 
his or her power to enforce it. It may well be clear to both individuals that there is always 
some degree of power involved in a business relationship and that the firms they represent 
have interests which are typically not congruent in a capitalist business environment. 
Nonetheless, the more both managers have developed a personal relationship, the more they 
will see the necessity to decide whether trust or power should be the prime coordination 
mechanism in their relationship in order to avoid awkward and unproductive behaviours. In 
that sense, we may say that it is indeed either trust or power which will ultimately dominate a 
relationship (Bachmann, 2001; also see Tillmar and Lindkvist, 2007). 
 However, research has also shown that in slightly different circumstances trust and 
power can go nicely hand in hand (Lane and Bachmann, 1996; 1997), or are even central 
preconditions of one another (see Möllering [2005], who persuasively makes this argument 
for trust and control). In particular, this seems to be case where trust and power are not 
mainly produced and maintained through face-to-face-contacts. In these cases, power 
typically appears in an abstract and depersonalised form, incorporated in behavioural rules 
and structural arrangements. Then, power is by no means to be understood as an alternative 
coordination mechanism to trust. Rather, one can say that resources of  power which are not 
individually available to one side of the relationship but exist, for example, in the form of 
collectively binding commercial law or social standards of business behaviour, are actually 
highly conducive to establishing and maintaining trust in a business relationship. Here, many 
scholars speak of 'system trust' (Luhmann, 1979; Giddens, 1990) or 'institutional-based trust' 
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(Zucker, 1986; Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011) which may govern the relationship between two 
actors, and it is particularly the latter form of trust that can exist in a symbiotic relationship 
with power. In other words, power in the form of 'system power' or 'institutional-based power' 
is highly conducive to (if not a condition of) building trust in business relationships 
(Bachmann, 2001). 
 The relevance of the combination of 'system trust' and 'system power' can be exemplified 
by two business partners who do not know each other at the face-to-face level. In this case, 
they may still be confident that sufficient depersonalised power, in the form of effective 
institutional safeguards, exists to make each other's behaviour relatively predictable. They 
will typically find it easy to build their relationship not only on power but also on trust. In 
this case, powerful institutions channel their mutual expectations and interaction into certain 
directions and thus make their behaviour (mutually) more predictable, i.e., trustworthy (see 
Rus and Iglic [2005] for the empirical example of Slovenia). In such circumstances the 
weaker party has 'good reasons' to trust that his or her business partner will not behave 
opportunistically and use his or her relatively greater individually available resources of 
power to ruthlessly maximise his or her individual interests. In other words, power – in the 
form of institutionalised power – can indeed contribute substantially to building trust-based 
relationships between business partners (Bachmann, 2001) and both mechanisms do not 
appear as alternative choices at all. 
 Against the background of these observations, we are inclined to conclude that the 
answer to the question of how and to what extent trust and power can be combined depends 
largely on the forms trust and power take on in a specific situation. On the one hand, 
institutional trust and institutional power can reinforce each other and may thus be seen as 
combinable generalised symbolic media of communication. On the other, interaction-based 
forms of trust and power – i.e., those forms of trust and power which constitutively rest on 
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the dynamics of a face-to-face-based relationship – are only combinable to a certain degree 
and typically require a decision as to where the emphasis should ultimately lie, either on 
interpersonal trust or on interpersonal power.  
 Thus, trust and power can be seen as generalised symbolic media of communication 
which – depending on the context – are more or indeed less combinable. The forms in which 
trust and power occur determine whether trust can be a secondary generalised symbolic 
medium of communication riding comfortably on the back of power as primary medium (in 
the case of institutional forms of trust and power being prevalent), or whether trust appears as 
a less compatible, sometimes even contradictory, generalised symbolic medium of 
communication which governs a relationship in which little or no reference is made to the 
institutional environment (in the case of interpersonal forms of trust and power). In the latter 
circumstances, either trust or power can be the primary medium, while the remaining of these 
two media then functions as the secondary medium.  
 The following figure depicts the two different types of relationships between trust and 
power that can occur, with money being the overriding principle in business contexts. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Trust and money 
Let us now change the perspective and focus on the possible relationships between trust and 
money. As noted above, money usually does not work very effectively without trust. Money 
is a symbolic token and not a material product, into which, however, it should be convertible 
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at any time (Simmel, 1990; Ingham, 2004). But the latter can be a crucial issue, as historic 
examples of hyper-inflation or the current Euro-crisis show all too clearly. Thus, we may say 
that money often goes hand in hand with trust and sometimes cannot do its job without a 
significant degree of trust (Beckert, 2006). Similar to some forms of power (i.e. institutional 
power) and some forms of trust (i.e. institutional trust), money and trust seem to re-confirm 
each other as generalised media of symbolic interaction, and money is constitutively 
connected to a considerable degree of trust in many business settings. On closer inspection, 
however, money can, again similar to power and trust, occur in two qualitatively different 
forms and consequently engage with trust in significantly different ways. 
  Consider situations where market participants use their private money to make extreme 
profits at the expense of their business partners. If, for example, a large retailer uses his or her 
monetary reserves aggressively to sell below purchasing prices over a long enough period of 
time to drive competitors out of the market, this is surely likely to undermine trust which may 
have existed between this retailer and other players in the market or prevent trust from being 
developed in the first place. Or, just to take another example, if a firm secretly buys large 
quantities of shares of a competitor to stage a hostile takeover of this rival, trust will not 
travel smoothly on the back of money. Against the background of such examples we need to 
concede that some forms of (using) money are incompatible with a high level of trust. 
Typically, these are large sums of money which are individually available and instrumentally 
usable to suspend the conditions of fair competition. Wherever money can be used in this 
way one has to decide to either go for a 'money talks' relationship or to place greater 
emphasis on the trust that the other party will not misuse its monetary resources. 
 In contrast, the specific forms of money which are particularly compatible with trust 
appear primarily in situations where the form and distribution of money provide mutual 
predictability to the exchange partners. Take, for example, the case of an equity-based joint 
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venture. Shared ownership of money can be conducive to building trust in such a relationship, 
i.e. between two competitors. Here, trust sits comfortably on the back of money and, as a 
secondary generalised symbolic medium of communication, it adds stability to a business 
relationship which is primarily organised on the basis of money (as the primary medium). It 
is usually small money or collectively owned money which – like in the case of power – is 
not fit for individual misuse, and this makes all the difference. Money which is embodied in 
infrastructure, education systems, state provided support structures for SMEs etc. falls into 
this category. In these cases money – i.e., collectively owned or small money – and trust (i.e., 
institutional-based trust) go nicely hand in hand. If, however, individually available or large 
money and interpersonal forms of trust are present one usually has to decide whether it is 
money or trust which should govern the relationship as primary generalised symbolic 
medium of communication and which of these mechanisms should have a secondary 
function. Of course, to some degree power is also always present in any business relationship 
and provides an important underpinning principle for such relationship.   
 The following figure summarises the two different combinations of money and  trust that 
occur in business relationships. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Business systems and typical combinations of generalised symbolic media of 
communication 
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Based on a media theoretical perspective, the historicity and embeddedness of trust, power 
and money can systematically be incorporated in our analysis. As shown, the system 
reference of these media is not a one-to-one relationship, in which each generalised symbolic 
medium of communication is assigned either to a particular organisational form or to a 
specific societal subsystem. Rather, various combinations of media appear to be viable in 
different business contexts and gain their specific characteristics through the consistent 
choice of actions that are compatible within multiple media simultaneously. Following the 
logic of path-dependency (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2011) such combinations create typical 
action channels in the respective environments. 
 Against this background, it seems useful to consider typical combinations of trust, power 
and money within the context of specific business systems (Whitley, 1992). For the sake of 
simplicity and in accordance with the literature on the varieties of capitalism (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001), we suggest looking at two ideal-typical business systems in the light of our 
suggested media theoretical approach: the 'liberal capitalist business system' as represented, 
for example, by the UK; and the 'coordinated capitalist business system' as present in 
Germany as well as a number of other countries in mainland Europe. 
 In a liberal capitalist business environment, we commonly find strong forms of 
interaction-based power and large individually available resources of money (Bachmann and 
van Witteloostuijn, 2009). Where powerful actors see a chance to use their power or 
monetary resources in order to maximise their interests it is quite likely that they will do so. 
A systematic and comprehensive system of commercial law is largely missing, which leaves 
room for the more powerful party to dictate the terms of the relationship to the weaker party.  
Less consistent and less reliable legal and social rules of how to conduct business, combined 
with a tendency towards short-termism (Lane, 1995), make it normal practice to push 
individually claimable profits to the limit. In this context, power based on individually 
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available resources and private ownership of large resources of money which can be 
mobilised very quickly – especially in a stock-exchange based financial system – seem to be 
just two sides of the same coin. 
 Trust, by contrast, is a generalised symbolic medium of communication which tends to 
keep its distance from the other two media in this type of business system. Trust certainly 
occurs in business as well as other social relationships but it is often not a constitutive 
element in the coordination of business relationships. Where it is present it primarily takes on 
the form of interaction-based trust, i.e. it arises from highly personalised relationships in 
which two individuals build trust on the basis of repeated face-to-face contacts. Despite the 
fact that trust can be a highly efficient lubricant in business relationships it thus remains a 
generalised symbolic medium of communication of local reach and with no strong position 
among the fundamental drivers of this system. 
 By contrast,  in the coordinated capitalist business system institutional-based trust 
typically goes hand in hand with institutional-based power (Lane and Bachmann, 1996). The 
latter is a form of power that appears as powerful rules which are meant to be, and generally 
are, accepted as collectively binding. Sometimes this system may be seen as over-regulated 
and imposing harsh constraints on business activities. However, it is precisely this feature of 
the system which also feeds strongly into the production of trust, i.e. institutional-based trust 
(Lane and Bachmann, 1997). Business partners find each other more predictable and 
aggressive forms of individual profit maximising at the expense of the other party occurs less 
often in these circumstances. In this business system trust and power engage in a symbiotic 
relationship where power is particular conducive to fostering trust in business relationships 
(Bachmann, 2001). 
 Money is, of course, also not irrelevant in this system. However, it is – as noted above – 
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crucial which form and function money takes on. If it is small and slow money, for example 
when a small or medium-sized firm takes out a loan from a state-controlled regional bank (as 
is most common practice in this system [Lane, 1995]), then money is a generalised symbolic 
medium of communication nicely compatible with institutional power and institutional trust. 
This form of (using) money builds on collectively accepted transparent and powerful rules, 
and it is thus quite conducive to creating and maintaining trust, i.e. institutional-based trust. If 
all goes well, power, money and trust all push in the same direction: they suggest long-term 
business horizons and reduce individual risk as much as opportunities for individual 
opportunism. Business behaviour in this system tends to be cushioned in many rules and 
institutional safeguards. The generalised symbolic media of communication that are relevant 
in governing business relationships in this system are part of a coherent framework which 
makes the system as a whole powerful but leaves individual actors with less options to (mis-
)use their superior position than under a liberal capitalist regime. As this system shows, trust 
can thrive where capitalism is framed by extensive sets of social rules and legal regulations. 
This is why the German system, as opposed to the UK for example, has been repeatedly 
described a high trust system, where individual guile does not necessarily always win the day. 
 In sum, the liberal capitalist business system primarily draws on money and power 
(Ganßmann, 1988). Trust is not systematically supported in this system. It does exist, but its 
reach remains restricted largely to local interaction systems, i.e. interpersonal trust. In the 
coordinated capitalist system, by contrast, power and trust are the most important generalised 
symbolic media of communication. Of course, money is (by definition) also in the package 
here, but much less dominant. Many examples could be found to show that in this system 
tradition and commitment are often valued over short-term private profits (also see Lane, 
1995). 
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 The following table summarises the relevance of each of the 3 generalised symbolic 
media of communication in each of the two business environments. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article's argument goes beyond a TCE inspired view which simply identifies power 
(hierarchy) money (market) and trust (hybrid arrangements) as the three key governance 
principles in business contexts. Rather, it suggests a media theoretical conceptualisation of 
trust, similar to how this sociological approach (particularly in Luhmann's theoretical 
perspective) has dealt with power and money, to reconstruct the function of trust within 
complex socio-economic systems. In this perspective, power, money and trust appear as 
mechanisms which facilitate successful business relationships in that they reduce uncertainty 
and provide social connectivity among the relevant actors' expectations and interactions. 
Besides, various combinations of trust, power and money can be analysed within a coherent 
theoretical framework. Irrespective of the analytical differentiation of these mechanisms 
which are relevant in business relationships, we have shown that they are often actualised uno 
actu. They appear as primary and secondary generalised symbolic media of interaction, in 
combination with a third overriding or underlying medium, and we can also connect typical 
combinations of media with empirically specifiable business systems. With this approach two 
important goals can be achieved: first, we provide a contribution to further develop media 
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theoretical ideas and concepts as well as suggesting a theoretically guided empirical future 
research. Second, we suggest a place for trust among the core concepts of sociological theory 
and contribute to finally putting it where it belongs, namely at the foundations of social 
theory. As we have become aware of all too clearly in the current global financial crisis, 
neither modern business systems nor advanced societies can ignore the importance of trust. 
That is more than enough reason to place much more emphasis on the study of trust than 
social scientists have done in times when trust was a 'given' rather than a scarce and 
challenged resource. 
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   Overriding 
   Principle 
 
Primary 
Medium 
 
 
Secondary 
Medium 
 
 
Money 
 
 
 
Money 
 
 
 
Institutional Power 
 
 
Interpersonal 
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Power 
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Interpersonal 
Power 
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Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary    
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or Small Money 
 
 
Individually 
Available or Large 
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Interpersonal 
Trust 
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Institutional Trust 
 
 
Interpersonal 
Trust 
 
 
Individually 
Available or 
Large Money 
 
Power 
 
Power 
OR	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Table 3 
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
    
   Overriding 
   Principle 
 
 
Primary 
Medium 
 
 
Secondary 
Medium 
 
Liberal capitalism 
 
Coordinated capitalism 
 
 
Individually Available or  
Large Money 
 
 
Collectively Controlled or 
 
Small Money 
 
 Interpersonal Power 
 
 
 
Institutional Trust 
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Interpersonal Trust 
 
 
Institutional Power 
 
